Gold Fields purchased Western Areas (through a share swap) and thus inherited the notoriously “toxic” hedge-book of Western Areas. This event is worth considering in the light of my previous blog on hedging. Let’s apply some analysis and critical thinking here.
First, some real-world imperfections. The hedge book was created in the time of the equally notorious Brett Kebble’s involvement in Western Areas. The structure, the banks involved and the behind-closed-doors-dealings that went into it are not the subject of this post. Definitely scope for some difficult questions here though.
Ok, but what about the hedge itself? Why was it terminated? Ian Cockerill, Chief Executive Officer of Gold Fields said:
- “We terminated the Western Areas hedge book because we believe in gold. “
- “The hedge book was significantly under water and was a crippling liability to the South Deep mine. Now we can bring the asset to account in a transparent manner.”
- “Gold Fields is of the view that the price of gold remains firmly in a long-term upward trend and, with that outlook, it does not make any sense whatsoever to be hedged.”
- “It also ensures that Gold Fields remains fully transparent to investors, and that its balance sheet remains simple to understand.”
Let’s take each of these statements in turn.
- So Mr Cockerill is stating quite clearly that Gold Fields view is that gold is a good investment, that they expect to make profit about increases in the price of gold over time. Fair enough. And since they are in the gold mining industry, perhaps they will have a more informed view than the average Joe. However, since they are in the gold mining industry, maybe they have a biased view of gold. Most management teams are notoriously optimistic about their company, their industry and can never understand why their share prices are so far below fair value! Also, this doesn’t address my major point that shareholders can easily adjust their exposure to gold in any case. This doesn’t present any arguments for operational improvements or similar efficiencies from terminating the hedge book.
- A crippling liability? Raising cash to pay off a liability simply accelerates the cost to now. Not necessarily a bad thing, but not clearly a good thing either. This probably makes sense within the context of point 4 below.
- Hmmm, a rehash or point 1 then. Except Mr Cockerill takes it further. “It makes absolutely no sense to hedge”. Well, as I described before, there is more to the decision to hedge than a simple view on the prospects of the gold price. One wonders whether Mr Cockerill couldn’t have expanded on his logical thought process that helped him conclude that there was absolutely no sense.
- Ah. Yes! A very valid point, and possibly the only valid point we’ve seen so far. Hedge books are complicated derivative structures and an excellent mining analyst should know about mines and mining and minerals and prices and not necessarily a thing about fancy derivative structures. Fully agree on this one.
So this leaves us with 1/4 or 25% relevancy score. Ok, this is a bit harsh, but it does support my view that hedging decisions are made more on emotion and rhetoric than on rationality and facts.
Now, there is another side to the story. From http://www.mineweb.co.za:
Western Areas also stated that â€śthe hedge banks may be able to terminate the derivative structure as a result of existing circumstances or as a result of an acquisition of control of Western Areas by Gold Fields and in that event, Western Areas may need to make a material payment to the hedge banks and would seek to raise this amount from shareholders, in proportion to their shareholdings. If Gold Fields acquires 100% of Western Areas, then Gold Fields will need to deal with this issue with Western Areas and the hedge banksâ€?.
So, in other words, regardless of what Mr Cockerill and his management team think about gold, they were probably close to forced to close out the hedge book in any case. Let’s hope this was a happy coincidence and not pure spin.
Some more background on the story: