That’s the ballpark figure I usually work with as the minimum number of micro insurance policies required for scale. The expenses of running even a micro insurer are not that trivial.

For underwritten products within a full life licence? Larger premiums per policy but definitely more complexity. Competition is tougher too. Hyper local brands don’t translate into trust at this level. Viable niches may exist, but at what volumes?

You might wonder if there is scope to sell greater value products at higher premiums that can bring that number down in some contexts?

The rise of embedded insurance

Turns out this has been given plenty of thought already – “micro” insurance is the less popular name these days from a product and provider perspective. Inclusive Insurance certainly sounds better and more inclusive (!)

I think part of that push though was recognising the challenges and limits of truly “micro” insurance, at least at an individual level in providing commercially viable options that meet needs at the scale necessary.

Inclusive Insurance has been eclipsed in some words for “embedded insurance”, a term that talks less to the needs and objectives for society, and more to one that is practical and viable commercially. Embedding insurance in other products are services can drive down some of the costs, but then by virtue of being embedded, the absolute amount of premium is even further limited. Volumes may go up – and there have been some success stories here – but margins typically remain fine so I’m going to guess that my 40,000 may be too low in these instances. The success stories are in the 6- and 7-digit volume space.

Microinsurance licence restrictions

Back to “microinsurance” and the regulatory restrictions that apply in South Africa:

• Savings elements might seem attractive to increase premium size and provide “value” rather than a set price point. But savings elements are not permitted in microinsurance policies in South Africa.
• Loyalty schemes or cash back may be a way to attach greater value to a product, but again are not permitted in the microinsurance framework.
• Fairly large sums assured are possible within microinsurance – often attracting increased adverse selection or outright fraud.

Can product tailoring increase average premium?

Product tailoring can be expensive and can counter plans for
economies of scale while simultaneously targeting a smaller market. I’d still like to see more of this rather than pure commodity products. I’d be happy to be wrong if this approach meant a viable micro insurer could provide genuine value, see strong demand, and require fewer than 40,000 policyholders or comfortably sell more than that.

Microinsurance pros and cons – an important choice

A key point here is whether a standalone microinsurer is the right vehicle for a truly niche insurer? The increased governance and compliance policies effected by the major cell providers have frustrated cell owners and entrepreneurs, slowed down innovation and led them to look elsewhere. A microinsurance licence is a great option for some, but not a panacea for everyone.

I’ve helped insurers apply for licences, buy licences, consider alternative arrangements, and I’m sure at some point I’ll be working with micro insurers to transfers portfolios to other insurers and close down licences.

There is also opportunity to apply to the Prudential Authority for scope to do more with the licence, with careful consideration of the risks and capital.

Does digital fix everything?

Digital sales is a complex area. Some insurers have had some success with purely digital sales. But when these distribution channels are owned by someone else, the costs are not as low as “digital† might make you think. If NTUs are high, and premium collections are low, it can quickly become expensive. There’s a fine line between removing friction from a sales and underwriting process (which definitely improves sales) and making it so easy to “sell† that the customers haven’t really decided that they want what they’ve bought.

Parametric insurance – watch this space!

We should be doing far more with parametric insurance in South Africa. Thinking around climate risk and the positive role insurers can provide in this space (rather than only worrying about the risks it poses to them) may present some new opportunities. Insurers can apply their expertise in understanding and pricing risk, while providing a socially and economically beneficial product at a price that shows value and profit.

A distribution channel that has never quite got off the ground is even more challenging. With confidence shaken, it’s easy to wonder whether success and scale will ever be possible.

Over the last couple of years, I haven’t engaged with a life insurer that hasn’t experienced some of this. You might be surprised by how ubiquitous this is:

• Yesteryear’s giants of funeral products struggling against the compelling advantage of bank branch, app and call centre distribution. This shakeout has probably benefitted customers with more attractive pricing at the cost of margin for providers.
• Organisations with strong brand and huge existing customer base struggling to generate meaningful volumes of commodity products, becoming reliant on expensive aggregators to achieve some amount of scale.
• Insurers seeing their market attacked by banking competitors investing significant sums into their banking operations – looking for a share of banking revenues and profit, but very much also looking to defend their insurance customers from extremely competitive banks. Some of the success of banks relates to their better digitalisation of distribution systems and related processes. Digitalisation is necessary but not sufficient – as evidenced by the banks slow progress in distributing complex underwritten products.
• Established insurers with success in non-underwritten products, and others with success in complex fully underwritten products, both struggling for scale, persistency and profitability in simplified issue / lightly underwritten products. Maybe it’s only a matter of time before someone cracks this, but for now I’m pretty wary of impressive sales volume projections.
• Insurers with impeccable track records of successful distribution feeling unfamiliar pressure on margins and volumes. (Increasing prices to improve margins can be self-defeating if volumes drop and fixed expenses burn margins further.)
• Life insurers urgently looking for new markets to expand to, including non-life, in order to keep growth going as their core market stagnates. (There are opportunities, but it’s not a simple transition. A key message is that what works for one market segment quite likely won’t work for another.)

I’ll be posting more on this theme in the coming weeks. If you have questions, post below and I’ll try to work them into future posts.

If you are a master of the dark arts of distribution, what do you see as the common or recent failings? What is the key to focus on? Is there just one?

The larger insurance players seem reluctant to enter the market. Why do you think this market has been slow on the uptake? The regulatory barriers to entry certainly don’t appear to be that restrictive so either existing insurance companies are not flexible enough to offer the products required or it’s a poor business decision/larger risk that they’re unwilling to take on. Do you have an opinion on what is causing the low number of microinsurance players in the market?

So here goes. Certainly a far from complete or perfect answer, but a starting point based on my discussions with many people and entities actively interested in pursuing the market over the last few years.

What do we mean by micro insurance in the South African context?

The issue with micro insurance is scale, particularly of distribution and distribution costs. Okay, followed closely by premium collections (and that is about maintaining scale so that you don’t lose insurance policies as quickly as you sell them). These are the two issues that need to be solved for real success for any new micro insurer or a new platform for micro insurance.

Micro insurance and funeral insurance

Whether micro insurance is big in South Africa or not comes down to how one defines “micro insurance†.  There are major life insurance players that have funeral products with modest premiums, below R100 or even R50 per month. So those large insurers (major traditional insurers plus the bancassurers) are operating in this space already, but as “assistance business† as the current licence category is termed.

Under some definitions, South Africa is already one of the largest micro insurance markets in the world. On other measures, there are still plenty of excluded people who could benefit from appropriately priced, appropriate value insurance on a micro scale. I still hope to see viable products with premiums below R10 per month (and not on some misleading bundled basis) or even less on a micro-transaction basis.

These players are less interested in the particulars of a micro insurance licence because they have yet to see a material benefit. Product restrictions and the complexity of an additional licence don’t warrant lower capital since they aren’t actually constrained by regulatory capital but rather by their own view of economic capital.

Distribution innovation

Some of these players have tried innovative products (pre-paid funeral plans, allowing skipping premiums) with low, no or at best moderate success. The bancassurers push heavily into ATM, USSD and call centre sales rather than branch sales because they are lower cost, and sometimes lower risk of anti-selection. Getting life insurance via the banking apps is an easy step (and some have taken it) so probably the view is that a dedicated app just for insurance is unnecessary.  The banking brands (target of popular complaints as they sometimes are) are still generally well trusted.

The traditional insurers have invested in their own distribution channels, more typically broker- or agent-driven, for decades and this has carved them a good, profitable niche. Changing that for revolutionary distribution has risks.

Fraud and anti-selection are key concerns when you have the ability to turn coverage on and off.  I think many insurers are quite nervous about this. I’d love to see someone dedicating a small pot (R25m or something, so significant enough to do something with, but small enough for major players not to declare a national emergency if I doesn’t work) and experiment with something and see how it goes.

Micro insurance for assets

On the non-life side it’s more a definite gap. Acquisition costs, risk selection, differentiated pricing, claims underwriting and fraud risk (very serious fraud risk!) are non-trivial things to overcome.

Underwriting / risk assessment at policy inception is an expensive exercise. Claims stage underwriting can be problematic from a customer experience perspective if the policyholder genuinely expected to be covered and wasn’t (in which case even refund of premiums paid doesn’t help them, and with that the insurer has likely already incurred a loss based on the claims assessment and administration costs).

Credit insurance and micro insurance – but are we doing it right?

Credit insurance is the one area that sidesteps many of these issues. Clearly established need, assessment of ability to pay, distribution and lower fraud. It’s a pit this is also one of the areas that has achieved such a bad reputation (much of it deserved) for charging high premiums and making super profits based on the lack of a good market. It feels like we should be doing better here.

It would be amazing if someone could also consider what sort of loss they’d be prepared to take on a pilot programme to see if our worst fears are realized for asset insurance outside of the credit insurance space.

All the other hot trends

I’m staying close to developments on what I term “hyper selection† and also peer-to-peer insurance.  Some of this may present opportunities to unleash micro insurance from its current constraints.  I haven’t yet seen developments that seem ready for prime time and which solve what I view as the fundamental problems. Hopefully someone is already quietly working on something incredible in this space.

Micro insurance – opportunity for society, opportunity for business or both?

But the real answer to your question is that the supposed huge potential of micro insurance is a little difficult to pin down in pure commercial terms. Most of the success stories of micro insurance in emerging markets and public-private partnerships, NGO programmes etc.  Many of these also fail even with an explicit return on capital requirement.  Solving these issues on acceptable commercial terms for insurers who already have a successful business is a big question mark.

So even with my belief that micro insurance and inclusive financial services is a good thing for society, it’s less clear to me that it’s an easy buck to make for insurers.

Pick n Pay had to spend a fortune on the Smart Shopper system and has ongoing expenses in terms of rewards and analysis. The curious thing for me is how many loyalty cards incur the system and reward costs for retailers, but without gaining the full benefit of analysis and thus insight into customers.

I don’t get tailored book suggestions from Exclusive Books. They also haven’t tried to entice me back to their stores since I started buying first from Bookfinder.com and then almost exclusively ebooks from Amazon. They’ve basically lost a customer and haven’t done anything about it.

Even my friend’s St Elmos offers sweet deals to customers who haven’t ordered in a while to entice them back. Pick n Pay turned sub R100 pm customers into R350 pm customers (at least while the special was one) by specifically targeting customers that are familiar with Pick n Pay but need a push to become regular, high-spending customers.

I haven’t had a movie card with Ster Kinekor in a while, but I always use the same email address and credit when I purchase tickets online (which I do almost universally). There have been periods of several months where I haven’t gone to the movies, but no attempt from Ster Kinekor to woo me back with free popcorn or a careful movie recommendation.

Retailers are missing a trick to get an edge over their competitors.

It’s a good piece of legislation, even if at times some aspects of it may result in greater costs than benefits.

TimesLive has a story about the alleged noncompliance of medical schemes with the CPA.

Some of the issues may have merit, but this struck me as particularly troubling:

According to the act, it is unfair when a consumer is discriminated against on the grounds of age.

Our constitution explicitly allows discrimination on actuarially sound rating factors that have both a statistical and causal link. This is how insurance is South Africa still uses underwriting to select homogenous groups of risks and to limit anti-selection by policyholders. If widespread anti-selection were to occur, then life insurance would not be viable.

Medical Schemes in South Africa have only very limited underwriting options in order to provide as many citizens as possible with fair health coverage. “Late joiners” are charged a premium since they haven’t contributed to the societal risk pool since they were most healthy and therefore haven’t paid “their fair share”. This has to do with a specifically identified risk rather than general discrimination based on age. These restrictions are important to maintain the solvency and viability of medical schemes.

Some schemes prevent women who fall pregnant within nine months of joining the scheme from claiming for the pregnancy even though they pay full premiums

This point is more tricky, but it does again reflect a misunderstanding. “Full premiums” on an actuarial sound basis have probably not been paid, since the fair premium for a member who joins just to get pregnancy benefits and hasn’t contributed at other times would be much higher than the premium that is charged. This one is a little more grey and while I feel the rules are entirely fair, they may not be viewed that way by a particular judge on a particular day.

Some schemes require that members give three months’ notice when terminating their membership, whereas the act deems 20 business days to be reasonable

This might reflect the desire to not have members leave a scheme immediately after having utilized the maximum benefit available to them before joining another scheme. I don’t know how much of this behavior would ever happen, so this might also ultimately be changed.

Many schemes don’t enforce the allowed waiting periods for members joining. If some of these other changes were to be made, I would expect these provisions would be more regularly used. Of course, that is another of the problems cited with medical schemes arising from the CPA.

All in all, we may see some changes, but by and large these comments reflect a lack of appreciation for the actuarial realities of managing a health scheme with community rating.

New Business Margin, which is the Value of New Business (VNB) as a percentage of the Present Value of New Business Premiums (PVNBP) is a common measure of profitability of that news business.

But it’s a flawed measure, especially when it comes to comparing product lines and insurers or even to understand the change in profitability from one period to the next. It uses and unequal yardstick to measure business.

New Business Margin on Revenue (NBMR) provides a significantly improved measure of profitability that can be used to compare margins across products, across insurers and across time. Further, it leads easily to a component analysis of the margin, adding additional insights to shareholders, brokers and regulators.

If you haven’t read my introductory post on New Business Margin on Revenue, it would be worthwhile doing so now – this post is going to illustrate the sort of results it provides in a practical, numerical example.

Example 1 considers how NBMR clarifies distortions from a change in mix of business.

Example 2 shows how more complex dynamics can be understood through a component analysis of NBMR. The spreadsheet showing the underlying calcs is attached at the end of this post.

Example 1 – A change in mix of business

AGGREGATE PICTURE

Let’s look at the sort of aggregate information you’ll typically see in an EV report.

What one might take from this analysis is that VNB is constant, but margins are declining to below 2.0%. If this is the only information on which to base our analysis, this company might be a clear “sell” and products and pricing need to be updated by management.

Let’s see how this would look using NBMR

From this table we see again that VNB has been constant, but that the profitability of the business has actually been slightly increasing.  So, although we should consider attending to the zero-growth VNB, the actual margin we’re achieving on our business on this measure has improved slightly from 25.5% to 26.1%.

This is a more accurate picture, because as you can see from the following tables, all that has changed is our mix of business – and the investment business that we’re writing more of now actually has a higher NBMR than the risk business we’re selling less of.  The traditional New Business Margin measure is distorted because it treats the entire premium paid by the policyholder as “revenue” when in fact only a small share of it is fees and charges and the rest is more like a deposit.  Again, banks measure profitability and performance through RoE, Cost to Income Ratios and Net Interest Rate Margin and only very much behind those the return on total assets.

Analysis of NBMR and components via product line

So the New Business Margin is constant on a product view, but when compared it appears as if there is a declining trend.  Also, at 26.7% of revenue taken as profit for investment business, this is profitable business, a fact not obvious from the superficially low New Business Margin of 1.3% (which is actually a perfectly good profit margin on that measure, just difficult to understand and compare).

The Revenue Per Premium (RPP) is 100% for risk business and 5% for investment business.  Depending on policy size, a 5% deduction from every premium might be a little on the high side and from a Treating Customers Fairly and sustainability perspective, this area may require some attention.  It’s also fair to ask “why are we losing market share in risk products and what can be done about it”, but at least we see this as a mix of business and market share issue and not a business margin issue.

Example 2 – Complex changes in volume, profitability and other components

Aggregate picture

Example 2 is more complex.  Let’s look at the aggregate information on a traditional presentation first.

In this case it looks like we have a severe margin squeeze problem in spite of increased business volumes and increased VNB. By now it should be clear that it’s dangerous drawing conclusions from this information.

A more coherent aggregate view can be obtained using NBMR:

Here we see a strong 2011 increase in all of VNB, Business Volumes and New Business Margin on Revenue after a poor year in 2010.  On the whole, we are hanging to customers longer than before (Discounted Premium Term or DPT up form 5.4 in 2010 to 5.6 in 2011, but still not at the levels of 2009. This is worth investigating.

The share of each premium we get as revenue has dropped sharply – clearly suggesting a change in mix of business as this sort of change wouldn’t typically be seen otherwise. Clearly we need to dig further, but the previously bleak picture is already looking better – and as we’ll see this is a more accurate reflection of business reality.

ANALYSIS OF NBMR AND COMPONENTS VIA PRODUCT LINE

Immediately we see a huge amount of new information.  Risk business has been declining in profitability significantly and has also had a dramatic increase in lapse rates (since the Discounted Premium Term has dropped to 3.2, suggesting major problems with persistency).

At the same time, although 2010 was a step backwards in terms of DPT for Investment business, the increase in volumes of business (API), allied with a restoration of the DPT to close to 2009 levels, a reduction in RPP (suggesting better value for policyholders, which should give rise to better future sales, lower persistency and less regulatory intervention) and a strong growth in NBMR, driven off efficiencies, expense reductions and economies of scale through greater sales.

Our risk business is in trouble and requires attention, but we are building a solid, profitable and sustainable investment business that should provide good returns to shareholders.

Conclusion

These are stylised examples filled with hidden good news. The reality is that many insurers are struggling in several business units.  The analysis and tools outlined here can help make better informed decisions around product strategy and pricing, and for analysts wanting to better understand the current and potential future financial performance of these stocks.

For short-term business (group risk, health insurance, health administration, general insurance etc.) it is something different since these lines don’t have long-term prudent provisions. In these cases it reflects the present value of future profits expected to be earned out of the existing business.

The inclusion of these short term types of business within EV is widespread. It seemingly increases consistency between different types of contracts since we are considering the long-term expected profitability in all cases. More on this apparent consistency in a moment.

What do we include in the EV and VIF?

EV is not a complete economic measure of the value of an insurer, since it ignores future profits arising from future new business. This is by design. An Appraisal Value incorporates the Value of Future New Business (VFNB) as well, although there is always subjectivity over how many years of future new business should be included. (More on this in a separate post.)

Existing Business vs Future Business

The idea of “existing business” and “future new business” is clear in the individual life context. It’s existing business if you have a contract, and future new business if not. Premium increases and slight benefit modifications can usually be accommodated within the existing contract and so should ideally be included in the Value of In Force (VIF) based on the expected probabilities of these changes.

As such, the expected future premium increases should also be factored into the Value of New Business (VNB) when the business is originally sold. (Don’t confuse VNB with VFNB.  VNB is the value of business written over some past historical period, typically the last month, 6 months or year. VFNB is the expected value to owners of the business from business that will be sold at some point in the future.)

What counts as In Force for short term contracts?

The position is less clear for Group Risk or Motor policies. These are typically annual contracts, but with high expectations of renewal. In this case the renewals are typically included in the VIF at some assumed level of premium inflation reflecting wage growth rather than new business. Premium inflation is an important consideration in countries with non-negligible inflation. New employees on an existing Group Risk policy are also usually not considered new business since no new sales activity was performed or purchasing decision was made.

The rules applied then are quite well understood. However, we are valuing two different things between short term and long term contracts, and also a little bit of something we shouldn’t.

The source of value for long-term and short-term contracts in the EV

For long term contracts, we are valuing expected future surpluses arising out of a long-term contractual right and prudent regulatory provisions.

For short term contracts we are valuing the existing contract (a small portion of the total value) and the customer relationship that will give rise to future renewals.

There is also a component of customer relationship in the long-term contractual rights since poicyholders can lapse the contract, incur some penalties possibly, but ultimately not be required by law to continue paying premiums. It’s difficult to separate these components though.

Unintended inclusion of brand value

Now the interesting part: I maintain that by using a best estimate future renewal rate for short term contracts, we are actually valuing a portion of the brand over and above the customer relationship. This is best demonstrated by an example.

Example of confounding of customer relationships and brand value

Take a company with a 20pc market share in the group risk market in which it operates. Let’s also say that best estimate future renewal rate is 80pc. If we assume a constant market share percentage (arising because of the value of the brand, but may be also broker networks etc.) then 1 in 5 employer groups looking for group risk cover will choose our hypothetical company – ignoring customer relationships.

Some of our customers will be very pleased with our service and will renew for that reason. The good customer relationship is a significant source of value. However, some of our customer won’t particularly value our service or relationship. Some of these will leave, but others will stay anyway – because of the value of our brand.

In fact, we should expect 20pc of our existing customers to renew even if there is no customer relationship at all. Why should existing customers be less likely to choose us again even if there is no customer relationship than a brand new customer?

Some of our customers may be so put out by an unfortunate incident, poor service or a repudiated claim that they may deliberately not renew. A customer relationship doesn’t have to have positive value.

So of our 80pc renewals, 20pc renew for reasons independent of our customer relationship. So the correct renewal rate to apply when measuring customer relationships is actually 60pc.

The impact can be significant

This makes a significant difference to the VIF. For a 20 year projection and 20pc market share, the difference is a reduction in VIF of 46pc. For a 10 year projection with a 5pc market share, the difference is still 14pc.

You can test the impact using this Renewal Test model under Example Models.

What does this mean practically?

Now we haven’t changed the true value of the business; we’ve changed how much of it we recognise as a customer relationship. With a lower VIF, we would expect to see positive renewal experience variances (if we compare actual renewal rates to modelled) or higher volumes of new business (if we treat the portion of renewals related to overall market share as new business) athough the new business margin on revenue will be lower since we are modelling a lower Discounted Premium Term (DPT).

Neither of these results is very satisfactory. Perhaps the answer lies in separating renewal into a change in market share impact and the remaining renewal variance so that the VNB is still objectively measured as new sales, but the persistency profits are separately allocated between the known adjustment for brand and the actual deviations from renewals being further different than expected.

Merger and Acquisition pricing and accounting

Specifically though, this has important implications for accounting for insurance mergers and acquisitions and the types of intangibles created. It also feeds into the purchase price decision and valuation adopted for an acquisition. Ultimately, views of the Appraisal Value of annually renewable business must incorporate these important differences when compared to individual life businesses.

It wasn’t that long ago that financial institutions needed marble-clad offices and multi-decade histories to show that they were serious and were financially stable and could be trusted. Now the organisations that generate trust are barely a decade old and interact with customers in a purely virtual form.

“If Google got up and said we are going to offer a savings account, for me, that would be very difficult and confronting,”

I already use and love Google Checkout, which allows me to purchase items quickly from a variety of sites without having to enter (or share!) my credit card information with the new merchant. I honestly wish all merchants supported it.

PayPal has had a difficult history in South Africa, given that only very recently have we been able to withdraw funds from PayPal (and only via FNB even now). Still, I trust them more than most merchants.

One reason I might be concerned about Google as a bank is that since it would be so internationally successful, it would be an insanely attractive target for hackers. The number of attack vectors that would be pointed its way would be particularly concerning. (Yes, I’m writing this from a virtually virus-immune Mac for similar reasons.)

All companies must focus on trust and genuine relationships with clients, but no more so than financial services companies.

It’s done none of these because the logic underlying it was flawed. Analysts focused on interconnect as an expense, happily ignoring the revenue side (since it was a fee paid to another company within the industry). Never has a telecoms issue been so badly hijacked by lack of understanding.

Now, in a press release that is a little vague, BMI TechKnowledge reflect concerns that telecoms growth rates may be lower as a result of falling mobile termination rates.

The economics of a fund manager depends entirely on growing funds under management so that revenues (based on assets under management) grow to be larger than costs (significantly fixed and at most semi-variable). Details of performance fees and the second order impact of investment performance aside, a successful fund manager must attract positive net client cashflow, and lots of it.

Half the 960 available unit trusts have less than R100m in AUM. Some of these may be rapidly growing new funds, but many have been stagnant with slow growth for several years.

The FSB’s attention presents opportunities for consolidation between funds and should place larger funds in a stronger position competitively. Total Expense Ratios (TER) for these funds with significant scale should already be lower than smaller funds. Maybe it’s time the larger funds made more if their size and cost efficiencies. If they are going to take the heat for being too large to be nimble, they might as well reap the benefits too.

It will be interesting to see what this means for white labelled funds and whether the economics of these convince the regulator that they should survive.

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