But for many, this promise is being hindered by a foundational legal concept: The Principle of Indemnity.

By insisting that property insurance must always be a contract of indemnity (meaning you cannot recover more than your actual, audited loss) regulators have forced the industry into a structural kludge known as the “Dual Trigger.” It’s a legal “fix” that satisfies the status quo but creates a cascade of inefficiencies for insurers and consumers alike.

The Mechanism of the “Dual Trigger”

In a rational parametric model, the data event is the payout. In the regulated world, however, two hurdles must be cleared:

1. The Data Trigger: The physical event occurs (e.g., wind speed, rainfall).
2. The Indemnity Proof: The policyholder must provide evidence that their actual loss equals or exceeds the payout.

This second trigger creates what we might call the Indemnity Trap. It caps the payout at the lower of the two values, fundamentally changing the nature of the risk.

Where the Principle of Indemnity comes from – and why it is a good idea in traditional insurance

Traditional insurance needs indemnity. It ensures the contract restores you rather than enriching you. In the non-life market, we insure the uncertainty of a loss. We don’t just insure the occurrence of an event.

If you could collect a payout that far exceeded your actual loss, you’ve moved from a safety net to a lottery ticket. This “Lotto Effect” turns insurance into a legally sanctioned wager. That windfall potential creates a toxic moral hazard. It invites fraud like arson or staged theft. It also rewards negligence. Why protect an asset when you are worth more if it burns?

By capping payouts at the Ultimate Net Loss, we align the policyholder’s interests with the asset’s survival. Insurance remains a stabilizing force. It protects wealth. It doesn’t generate profit from destruction.

The Problem: Asymmetric Basis Risk

This structure creates a profound misalignment. When we layer an indemnity cap onto a parametric trigger, we create a one-way street of risk:

• When the data misses: If the storm causes massive damage but the sensor doesn’t hit the trigger, the policyholder gets nothing. This is the “Negative Basis Risk” everyone acknowledges.
• When the data hits: If the sensor hits the trigger but the physical damage is light (perhaps because the owner invested in resilience), the indemnity rule steps in and caps the payout.

The result is a structure where the payout can be lower than the data suggests, but never higher. This isn’t a malicious choice by insurers; it is a structural constraint that leaves the risk transfer incomplete. It also reintroduces the very thing parametrics were meant to kill: payout delays. The moment you require a loss audit, the “instant cash” benefit of the parametric model is lost to the administrative friction of the indemnity process.

The Pricing and Underwriting Friction

This isn’t just a headache for policyholders; it complicates pricing.

To price a “clean” parametric policy, an actuary only needs weather data. But to price a policy with an indemnity cap, they must also predict the probability of the cap being hit. This requires traditional, granular underwriting of the asset. We’ve replaced a low-cost, scalable model with a high-cost, bespoke one, simply to satisfy a legal definition.

Assessing the Regulatory Responses

Why do regulators cling to the indemnity requirement? While the intentions are often centered on market stability, the logic behind these defenses deserves a closer look.

Argument 1: The Mitigation Incentive The traditional logic is that indemnity prevents moral hazard. The fear is that if people “profit” from a disaster, they will want the disaster to happen. However, this overlooks a critical reality of resilience. Traditional indemnity insurance actually discourages mitigation. If you spend your own capital to save your factory with sandbags, your indemnity payout simply drops to match your lower loss. In a parametric model without an indemnity cap, you are rewarded for that foresight. You keep the surplus as a “resilience dividend.” The current rules are, in effect, a structural barrier to climate adaptation.

Argument 2: Speculation vs. Insurable Interest There is a concern that without a proof of loss, insurance becomes a “Lotto” or a wager on the weather. But the gatekeeper against speculation should be Insurable Interest, not Indemnity. If a buyer demonstrates a legitimate economic exposure to the event at the point of sale, the speculative element is already addressed. We do not need a cumbersome audit at the back-end to solve a licensing and gatekeeping question at the front-end.

Argument 3: The Life Insurance Precedent It is often argued that property must be treated differently from life insurance because assets have a market value that must not be exceeded. Yet, the Life, Disability, and Critical Illness sectors function perfectly well as “valued contracts.” These are multi-trillion dollar industries that rely on Insurable Interest and a Reasonable Sum Assured. There is no fundamental logical reason why a crop, a solar farm, or a retail business could not be treated with the same “valued contract” logic we already apply to human life.

The Path Forward: The “Ought”

We shouldn’t be trying to “fix” parametric insurance by adding indemnity caps. We should be updating the regulatory framework to recognize Index-Based Insurance as a distinct legal category.

A modern, rational framework would require three things:

1. Provable Insurable Interest (Ensuring the buyer has skin in the game).
2. Reasonable Sum Assured (A cap based on total economic exposure, not just physical damage).
3. Objective, Independent Data Triggers that are demonstrably correlated with the risk exposure

The current “Dual Trigger” system isn’t a design choice; it’s a symptom of a regulatory system that hasn’t changed fast enough. I’d argue the regulations are focused too much on the potential cost and risk of change, while glossing over the downsides of not changing.

Is it time to stop forcing 21st-century risk tools into a 19th-century legal box?

Regulatory Ambiguity: When Is a Dividend Foreseeable?

The official guidance under Solvency II and SAM states that foreseeable dividends must be deducted from Basic Own Funds (BOF). But when does a dividend become foreseeable?

The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) defines it as follows:

“A dividend is foreseeable when the payment becomes likely considering the dividend payment history of the company, the business development throughout the year, the reference date of the assessment and, where appropriate, other relevant circumstances.†

Similarly, the South African Prudential Authority (PA) states:

“A dividend is foreseeable at the latest when it is declared or approved by the board of directors, regardless of any requirement for formal approval at an annual general meeting.†

On the surface, this sounds reasonable. But what does “likely† mean in this context? More than a 50% probability? Should a dividend that is merely probable be deducted against a 1-in-200 stress scenario? The dividend itself is not independent of financial stress—if an insurer were actually facing a severe loss event, that dividend likely wouldn’t be paid.

Defining the latest time to recognise a dividend as foreseeable doesn’t help in deciding when a typical or expected time might be. The PA released “technical observations” on this a little while back. Even while taking pains to highlight that technical observations don’t count as regulation, they were still unclear around what is expected.

The crux is that the regulatory guidance provides no clear answer on whether insurers should assume dividends payable from the preceding financial period, or always consider the next 12 months of “likely” or expected dividends. Equally, they also aren’t clear that insurers should not take a multi-year view. Some regulations on subordinated debt require a five-year term to prove permanence. Should insurers also be considering a 3- to 5-year horizon for foreseeable dividends? That doesn’t seem to be expected, but the reasoning and application aren’t consistent across different parts of the regulations.

The Problem of Capital Permanence, Availability, and Loss Absorption

Under Solvency II and SAM, regulatory capital must meet three key criteria:

1. Permanence – Capital should be available for the foreseeable future.
2. Availability – It must be accessible to absorb losses when needed.
3. Loss Absorption – It should genuinely absorb financial shocks.

The rationale in deducting foreseeable dividends is that once a dividend has been communicated to the market or approved by internal management structures, even before shareholder approval, it is nearly impossible not to pay it. That capital is no longer available.

However, requiring insurers to deduct a full year’s dividend in advance assumes earnings have already been generated. If those earnings fail to emerge (as they wouldn’t in a 1-in-200 scenario), then the dividend would likely not be paid. The dividends can absorb these future losses. There’s a parallel here for liquidity risk – Should cash be held now to ensure liquidity for dividends months into the future, even though expected premium receipts will exceed even adverse claims—meaning the dividend could be comfortably funded from future positive cash flow?

Are insurers being asked to treat dividends like senior debt obligations rather than discretionary equity distributions? If so, does that undermine the core purpose of equity funding?

Divergent Industry Practice and Alternative Approaches

Given this uncertainty, industry practice varies widely:

• Many insurers argue that only dividends expected in terms of prior financial periods should be deducted, and then only once the decision has been made to pay the dividend.
• Some insurers take a conservative approach, deducting dividends 12 months ahead, taking a double hit from recently declared dividends and dividends for another year. This depresses reported SCR cover ratios, but should not change absolute required capital levels. Targeted SCR cover levels will often be determined using earnings at risk or economic capital models, or adverse scenarios from an ORSA – all of which will factor in the economic reality that distant future dividends are loss absorbing.
• Other insurers accrue foreseeable dividends based on assumed payout ratio and earnings retained to date. This approach has much to recommend it, including being consistent with many banks’ treatment.

The FCA’s approach under Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR, which applies to banks, not insurers) summarises this last option:

“Before the management body has formally taken a decision or proposed a decision on the distribution of dividends, the amount of foreseeable dividends to be deducted shall equal the amount of interim or year-end profits multiplied by the dividend payout ratio.†

This effectively accrues foreseeable dividends over time rather than imposing a sudden drop in solvency ratios when dividends are declared. While not part of Solvency II or SAM, it is an interesting approach that could bring greater stability to insurance solvency ratios.

Determining SCR Cover Targets: A Practical Approach

Given the uncertainty in regulatory guidance, insurers should ensure that foreseeable dividends are integrated into a broader capital strategy rather than treated as a compliance checkbox. The key is to align foreseeable dividends with SCR cover targets, earnings at risk, and capital models that reflect economic reality.

Rather than simply applying rigid deductions, insurers should consider:

• Economic Capital and Earnings at Risk: Many insurers set target SCR cover ratios based on earnings at risk, ensuring capital sufficiency over a medium-term horizon. Since distant future dividends are inherently loss-absorbing, capital models should reflect that rather than treating them like fixed obligations.
• Scenario-Based Capital Planning: Insurers often use adverse scenario testing to set SCR cover targets. These scenarios should reflect dividend flexibility—how payouts might adjust in stress events rather than assuming mechanical deductions.
• Aligning Regulatory and Economic Views: The disconnect between regulatory capital and economic capital is well known. A structured approach to foreseeable dividends should integrate both perspectives, avoiding artificial volatility in reported solvency while maintaining a robust risk framework.

Insurers that take a strategic approach to SCR cover target setting—factoring in foreseeable dividends dynamically rather than through arbitrary deductions—are better positioned to maintain both solvency resilience and investor confidence. In a regulatory environment that lacks precise guidance, a clear, defensible methodology can differentiate well-managed insurers from the rest.

As the parametric insurance market evolves, so too must our approach to capital modeling. The challenges are significant, but so are the opportunities for innovation and more accurate risk assessment.

At a minimum, the contribution to group surplus/deficit Own Funds (in excess of, or the deficit where Own Funds don’t cover the SCR), should be shocked for currency risk. This makes sense as soon as you think about what the risk to the group’s SCR cover is on currency depreciation. (Where there is a deficit, foreign currency appreciation is the risk, not depreciation. The opposite is true – and more intuitive – when there is a deficit.)

The final answer is that ICS will likely not be applied to everyone in South Africa, but it may inform the development of SAM group reporting. It may also be the basis of choice for subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. ICS is probably more relevant than you thought.

Business Rescue precludes creditors from applying for liquidation of the business. This is the removal of an existing right of lenders: “a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect of property in its possession”

From what I gather it’s not clear that this formally counts as default – might depend on specific loan or bond terms and how credit rating agencies respond to this.

How one “feels” about this is less relevant than the legal interpretation for cross-default provisions. It certainly feels like default to me.

For SAA, it’s also a step which means the government is no longer prepared to keep putting in money. That’s certainly a message about how likely any implicit (rather than explicit) governmental guarantees are for other entities.

Short aside on government debt and balance sheets

It’s not really so much that this is bad news, but rather this is the long-overdue recognition of how bad the news is around SOEs and their total contribution to the true Debt/GDP and their zero or negative contribution to the less-publicised Asset/GDP ratio. As I’ve mentioned before, another useful ratio would be (Debt-Assets)/GDP, which if measured carefully can be a more useful measure of the true financial position of a country and a better guide for decisions on whether to privatise an existing SOE.

A full balance sheet approach and one that considers return on capital (as well as also-important social-development, second-order, longer-term and positive externality items) should form a greater part of policy decisions.

Take ancillary capital as an example. To my mind, the basic principle is clear. I’ve validated this principle in discussions with Capital Requirements Task Group members, SAM Pillar 1 Subcommittee members, multiple actuaries familiar with the Solvency II principles and delegated acts on which we have based on South African rules. Here is the practical definition of “Ancillary Own Funds†

Ancillary own funds are sources of capital that are not on the balance sheet, but could become Basic Own Funds in certain circumstances. As such, they can still sometimes be used to demonstrate solvency.

Basic Own Funds then are on balance sheet items that contribute capital. These are the excess of assets of total liabilities, with very specific types of subordinated liabilities “added back† because they can absorb losses and meet other criteria. There are a few specific rules about other regulatory deductions form Own Funds, but generally, that is it.

(As an aside, the tiering of capital has almost nothing to do with how your assets are invested, and almost everything to do with the sources of capital. This is another recurring puzzle I find myself explaining a couple of times a month for some reason.)

Here’s one odd thing. Since the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is determined as the change in Basic Own Funds in various adverse scenarios, the possible change in creditworthiness or even outright default of a provider of a letter of credit or guarantee or undrawn loan facility has no impact on the SCR. This is part of the reason the use of Ancillary Own Funds requires explicit approval from the Prudential Authority.

If I were to change the formula, I would add change in Ancillary Own Funds to the SCR. I have yet to see a compelling reason to exclude it.

Until I read this article summarising Brian Kantor’s evaluation of the return on assets Eskom is achieving compared to international norms and how low their gearing is becoming compared to international norms for an ultra-low risk business.  Both of these elements work in the same direction.  Higher gearing will result in a higher return on shareholder equity for the same return on assets, and a lower hurdle rate for return on equity will allow for a lower return on assets which will then require less profit to achieve.

The view presented here is that Eskom is trying to make too much money and simply charging too much as a result. I hope this gets a lot more air-time.

Junk Bonds, also known as High Yield Bonds, are debt instruments issued by companies with poor credit ratings, or are the debt instruments of companies that were issued as high quality bonds from strong companies that have since fallen on hard times (“Fallen Angels”).

Typically these are any bonds that are not classified as Investment Grade (BBB rated or better).

Junk Bonds behave very differently from Investment Grade bonds. Their value depends only marginally on market interest rates and far more on the underlying economic strength and operational performance of the issuing company.

Junk Bond return characteristics

They don’t often the unlimited upside of ordinary equity, but with the high starting yield (10% to 25% depending on the circumstances) it can provide a very healthy return if the company doesn’t default. There is also a chance for rerating where if the strength of the company improves dramatically, the bond may be repriced to a lower market yield, resulting in a significant capital gain.

Founders keeping control

So company founders can issue junk bonds rather than diluting themselves by issuing equity and still provide attractive returns to investors and an opportunity for savvy investors (and those who just think they are savvy) to “pick” their company with the prospect of fantastic returns if it performs really well.

Did I mention the interest payments on the issued junk bonds are tax deductible for the business?

Why would investors be happy to invest in junk bonds?

Aside from the attractive returns possible, now is a particularly good time for investors to consider junk bonds. With low interest rates (particularly in the US, Europe, Japan sphere of the world) investors are looking for instruments to boost their yield. Junk Bonds can do just that.

Further, with the Fed (and to a lesser extent, other central banks) promising to keep interest rates low and therefore debt cheap for an extended period, the risks to investors are fairly low. Certainly, the perception is that the risk is lower in bonds than equities as an asset class – this is probably at least partly a mirage given the equity-like characteristics of junk bonds.

Moody’s has also shrunk it’s list of companies most likely to default, further encouraging views of low default probabilities.

I’ll be writing a few more posts related to bonds and junk bonds over the next few weeks so keep an eye out for those if you’re interested.

The reader “trymore” provides some details of a new deal apparently being run by Rudie Visagie. As I stated last time this gentleman’s name came up, I have no personal interest or involvement here at all. My interest was just to show how the deal made no business sense to Visagie given the significant interest rate, currency and credit risks involved. Thus, it sounded like a scam. At the time, I quite enjoyed hearing all the supporters claiming I just didn’t want him to succeed. Meanwhile, several regulators started to probe the dubious claims, and it became clear that apart from anything else, Visagie wasn’t licenced to carry out the business he was proposing.

They quickly quietened down when the whole thing fell apart and Visagie’s clients lost money. Several readers of this site gave their own stories to this extent.

“Trymore” had the following to say:

Our company was also approached to do bussiness with Mr Visagie’s new company , which is now called Better Life. Our clients would get Loans from them and on final approval would have to pay R5700.00, on enquiring about their company eg contact no’s , name of directors, physical address ect we were continuously stonewalled and eventualy given the name of their “attornies†?(who had no knowledge of them) and their buss address in Blouberg Str(they are merely renting desk space).So my advise to anyone wanting to do buss with Better Life is, DONT GO THERE!!!!!!

This is a little out of my area of knowledge, but it sounds like the wheels are turning yet again. One doesn’t need sophisticated risk models allowing for the interaction of multiple risks, individual behaviour and an estimate of one’s risk appetite to know that a business that isn’t proud to show itself off isn’t one you should trust.

This reminds me of the example of the business premises of banks versus supermarkets. Banks typically spend large amounts of money on fancy head-offices, marble floors, giant pillars and so on. Supermarkets don’t. The key differentiator is that at a supermarket, you don’t care if they are in business tomorrow or not. You can tell the quality of the products by inspecting it and if they aren’t around tomorrow you aren’t affected. A bank, on the other hand, needs to show that it is not a fly-by-night operator. It needs to show that it has the resources to withstand economic crises, interest rate shifts and tilts and butterflies, poor credit events and the operational risks associated with any business. A bank needs to convince customers that it is solvent and good for the long term.

I don’t deal with financial institutions that look like supermarkets. No matter how low the prices are.