I’m continually disappointed that Moneyweb continues to partner with this distraction.

As I’ve done in the past, I’ve analysed very quickly some of the results of the most recent competition. As background to that, the basic rules are:

1. Put up R20,000 of your own money
2. Trade over three months in currencies, commodities single stock futures and some index trackers.
3. Whoever has the most at the end wins a million rand
4. Everyone keeps what is left of their initial “investment”

So let’s be clear, there are no long-term investment learnings here.

The winner did return 165.5% over 3 months, which is not an impressive performance even though it might look like it.  The point is, given the volatility of the investment universe available for the competition and the encouragement towards rampant risk-taking, it’s entirely pedestrian performance.  It’s very likely an individual’s performance will be good given the wide range of possible outcomes.

Let’s look at some other statistics

These are not performance statistics of which to be proud. They are similar to the losses incurred in prior competitions.

So in short, the competition cost the entrants in total just over a million rand. Losing a million rand is a great way to Make a Million.

The theory is that the insurer isn’t then exposed to changes in the term structure on interest rates, only exposed to illiqudity/reinvestment risk to the extent of mortality fluctuations, isn’t exposed to currency risk and certainly isn’t exposed to credit risk. Without complex margining requirements like some swaps and without the need to roll cash investments over, government bonds should allow ALM teams to sleep well.

Now, Solvency II is likely to adopt a swap yield curve rather than bond yield curve. There are some good reasons here, including arguably fewer distortions from temporary supply and demand imbalances, improved liquidity and so on. The same yield curve is used for liquid liabilities so the allowance for an illiquidity premium over and above the swap curve at some times, in some ways and for some products is still under debate.

But what should Greek insurers do in the meantime?

Frankly, Greek government bonds don’t remove credit risk and the huge credit spreads on these instruments will create huge funding gaps and variability in earnings unless a Greek govi yield curve is used to value liabilities as well. It’s not clear at all that Greece will stay part of the Euro, so German government bonds don’t remove currency risk. German government bonds in any case are show signs of nervousness as yields creep up.

The swap market is exposed to the same Euro break-up risks as bonds. Which banks will survive, what happens to currencies in the meantime and what does that do to long-term Euro swaps? What about Euro-Sterling swaps issued by Greek banks (I’m not sure if these even exist though).

All in all, it’s good to be involved in ALM in South Africa, and even the Middle East just at the moment.

Part of the deal is a “50% loss for private investors”. Which is part true and part nonsense but will be an effective Greek default when enacted / agreed. (I don’t care how “voluntary” it may be, it’s a default and almost all definitions of default include restructuring of debt in any way that isn’t what was originally promised.)

Why is it only partly true? Well it’s not necessarily a “loss” for private investors. The probability of default on Greek bonds has been just about 100% for a while now. This probability of default is derived from market prices for Greek bonds and market spreads on Greek Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and an assumed Loss Given Default or Recovery Rate for investors when the bonds do default. Actual Recovery Rates vary widely, but often analysts plug in the average Recovery Rate over most of this century on unsecured debt which is around 40%.

So if market prices for Greek bonds assumed 100% default probability and a 40% recovery, then a 50% recovery doesn’t sound so bad. The potential downside is that Greece may still (need to) default on these written-down bonds at some point in the next two decades.

So the real question is what will the new probability of default be? Then we will know whether investors “took a loss” and perhaps gain the market’s view on how successful the deal really will be.

Market Risk Premium used in 56 countries in 2011: a survey with 6,014 answers

• Interesting not least because it is a survey of required Equity Risk Premiums (or Market Risk Premiums) rather than expected. The rates are higher than I use, although this is also useful information when attempting to perform a “benchmark” valuation. I still struggle to see how these high estimates tie in with prospective estimates of overall economic growth and market performance, which is an important sense-check on any ERP estimate.

The Equity Premium in 150 Textbooks

• The results show a range from 3% to 10%, and that 51 books use different equity premia in various pages. The 5-year moving average has declined from 8.4% in 1990 to 5.7% in 2008 and 2009. This declining trend has been observed over even longer periods and is one of the common reasons for mis-estimating the ERP. 

Equity Premium: Historical, Expected, Required and Implied

• This work provides a fairly in-depth analysis of the differences between the various definitions of ERP and a comprehensive survey of major sources for estimates of these. In general, the estimates of the Expected ERP over T-bonds (rather than short-dated T-bills) are in line with the range I use of 3% to 5% with several showing values to the lower end of this range.

This begs the questions:

1. What business plans were used in determining investment on our airports?
2. How did actual experience compare to those budgets?
3. What can we and ACSA learn from the difference between expectations and actual?
4. Did the marketing benefit of the World Cup more than offset the de-marketing impact of higher costs of travel to (and inside) South Africa?
5. Have these “investment expenditures” been capitalised on ACSA’s balance sheet and has the resultant asset been impaired or not?
6. Have these additional costs been added to the official costs for the World Cup (and why not?)

Who am I kidding -  huge sums of money were spent on the gut feel that it was a good idea and because spending other people’s money is easy and it’s self-glorifying to build grand airports.

Andrew Canter (of Future Growth) makes some strong statements about the “phone and dealer” approach to the South African bond market. When one of the arguments against Andrew’s preferred centralised, electronic order book is “we like the information we get from deal flow” I have to say I agree with Andrew.

and part 2 (which also includes some discussion of Covered Bonds with the clear links to Basel and indirect links to Solvency II and SAM)

Anything that makes it easier to determine an objective market price for valuation purposes, provides more information and transparency on an equal basis rather than advantaging a few select players sounds good.

The arguments that Primary Dealers are only viable through the information they gain from deal flow is a typical example of unfortunate cross subsidies between different, barely related economic activities which almost invariably drives inefficiencies.

Given the debate around recognising illiquidity premiums for IFRS and Solvency II / SAM purposes, a more liquid, more transparent market in bonds, particularly corporate and quasi-government bonds, would be immensely useful and would surely decrease illiquidity premiums and thus decrease the cost of raising debt financing for corporates.

He was saying that he doesn’t see the point in investing in debt instruments.  He explained that the return is low and the risk high since if the company gets into trouble, you’ll likely only get a few cents on the dollar back.

Well, he’s wrong.

Risk and asset-liability matching

Fixed Interest investments are often the only investment that makes sense when you need to match or hedge fixed liabilities.  Naively consdering expected return only and not asset-liability risks  gives naive results.

Credit risk premia more than compensate for default experience over time

It’s worth exploring risk a little further. The caller stated that if the company gets into trouble, it’s likely the bondholders will also be hurt, and will likely only get a few cents on the dollar. Well he’s wrong here too.

The historical default frequency for investment great bonds (BBB and above) has been hardly more than a few single digit percent.  The Loss Given Default (how much an investor will typically lose if the bond issuer does default) is anywhere from 35% to 80%, depending on the seniority of the instrument, which estimate you trust, how it is measured and when the estimate was made. It’s because there are so few investment grade defaults that the data is so sparse and the estimates so wide. However, it’s clear that the likely return won’t be “a few cents on the dollar”.

I’m going to hunt round for some references here so you’re not just trusting my word.

Illiquidity premia = higher returns for some

Given the illiquidity of many corporate bonds, the expected returns are even higher if you as an investors are not considered with easy liquidation of your investment. This is a “pure risk premium” that you will earn over time without expected loss.  You could purchase extremely high quality, well-collateralised debt and earn a good return above risk-free as long as you have the patience and resources to hold it for long periods or until maturity.