Category Archives: credit risk

Greek default?

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So European politicians have more or less agreed a deal which may, more or less, push some of their problems to one side for a period. Yes, I’m not madly optimistic about this as a cure-all.  This is not the end of the Euro problems.

Part of the deal is a “50% loss for private investors”. Which is part true and part nonsense but will be an effective Greek default when enacted / agreed. (I don’t care how “voluntary” it may be, it’s a default and almost all definitions of default include restructuring of debt in any way that isn’t what was originally promised.)

Why is it only partly true? Well it’s not necessarily a “loss” for private investors. The probability of default on Greek bonds has been just about 100% for a while now. This probability of default is derived from market prices for Greek bonds and market spreads on Greek Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and an assumed Loss Given Default or Recovery Rate for investors when the bonds do default. Actual Recovery Rates vary widely, but often analysts plug in the average Recovery Rate over most of this century on unsecured debt which is around 40%.

So if market prices for Greek bonds assumed 100% default probability and a 40% recovery, then a 50% recovery doesn’t sound so bad. The potential downside is that Greece may still (need to) default on these written-down bonds at some point in the next two decades.

So the real question is what will the new probability of default be? Then we will know whether investors “took a loss” and perhaps gain the market’s view on how successful the deal really will be.

Swazi King not sure he wants the conditions attached to the loan

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This is really fantastic news.  The Swazi King is apparently reluctant to accept the loan from South Africa because of the conditions imposed in the agreement. I was quite harsh in criticising the granting of the loan with only conditions for improvement far down the line.  (I still believe the first condition should be an immediate unbanning of political parties.)

Hearing that the conditions are sufficiently onerous that the borrower may not want it is great news. At the very least this reflects a balanced package rather than one heavily in favour of the undemocratic absolute monarchy of our neighbour.

I wonder how many of these conditions were added or modified after the initial public announcement. Cosatu, amongst other powerful groups, has also been very outspoken against the loan.

Somehow, somewhere

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National Treasury is mulling Deposit Insurance with an explicit charge on the banks.

This is not a new idea, and has historically been resisted by the major banks since they feel, generally rightly, that they are less likely to have a problem of confidence and therefore less likely to benefit from deposit insurance. Smaller banks, on the other hand, are certainly more at risk of a run on the bank arising due to perceptions thus causing a liquidity problem when a solvency problem doesn’t exist.

Determining the appropriate mechanism to charge for deposit insurance is not straightforward. Clearly the charge can’t be the same fixed amount for all banks as the exposure will be very different between banks. The large banks would lobby hard to pay a lower rate (even if a higher overall amount) for the insurance given that they should be less subject to those confidence issues.

But how to determine that difference? One could take cue from the market by looking at credit ratings and, even more market-oriented, the spreads on debt issued by the banks. Three immediate problems come to mind:

  1. Credit quality of long-term debt isn’t the same as protection for depositors
  2. Probability of default is an input into confidence issues but certainly isn’t the entire story
  3. Does anybody seriously still believe in the Efficient Market Hypothesis and trust that we can believe what the market offers as an impartial, objective and balanced view of reality?

So there are some fascinating technical problems to solve when implementing deposit insurance, not least of which is deciding how much gets protected.

What caught my eye was Moneyweb columnist, Phakamisa Ndzamela, demonstrating his disbelief at how deposit insurance could create a moral hazard and ultimately increase risk within the banking system.

some senior bank executives have cautioned that this could push the cost of banking higher and somehow encourage risky lending. [emphasis added]

Obviously Ndzamela hasn’t heard of the Savings and Loan crisis in the US in the 1980s, or, I don’t know, the Global Financial Crisis that we are still in, which was massively exacerbated (if perhaps not quite caused) through risk being accepted without due care because it was being passed off immediately to someone else.

Why S&P downgraded

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I don’t think many serious investors care that S&P downgraded US debt. Bond yields are down (more on this in my next post), which means prices are up. US stocks are down, but that’s more about concerns about US and global economic prospects than the credit of the US government.

Nevertheless, S&P did downgrade. Why? I don’t think it is primarily to do with a materially increased estimated probability of default. It has more to do with a change in the payoffs in a ‘game’ (as in game theory) S&P is playíng.

Consider the quadrant of options. S&P downgrades or doesn’t and the US defaults or doesn’t. I’ve constructed totally hypothetically, but perhaps plausible scenarios below, for the S&P’s potential assessment of losses under each possibility given their views and external perceptions of them before and after 2008.

Before 2008, the fallout that would come from downgrading the US and the US not defaulting would be significant and cries of “un-American” might be heard again. Even if the US were downgraded, default would still be a blow for S&P since anything above a BBB rating really shouldn’t ever default if there models are “correct”. I’ve thrown in another hypothetical, a 0.01% probability of default – in other words very low, and as you’ll see in the next scenario, not necessarily higher now for S&P to change their view.

Now, either on a traditional minimax (minimizing the maximum cost) or an expected value basis, before 20008 S&P wouldn’t downgrade the US. This is an important calibration, since S&P didn’t downgrade the US.

After 2008, even if we leave the assessed probability of default unchanged, the world is different and therefore we have different costs.  If S&P doesn’t downgrade the US – even if the US doesn’t default, there will be a cost to S&P since might share the view that the US could default now. The dent in credibility since 2008 means that S&P has to try harder to convince the skeptics that they don’t rate risky instruments as AAA. Along with this goes a massive hit if the US does default and S&P hasn’t downgraded the US. The good news is that at least now a downgrade is viewed more with more understanding even if the US doesn’t default (although be sure Obama’s White House is not happy at the moment).

After 2008, even if the assessed probability of default is unchanged, the minimax and expected value rules both suggested a downgrade is the better option for S&P.

Before 2008

 Don’t downgrade

 Downgrade

 PD

0.0001
Default

-500.0

-50.0
No Default

0.0

-1,000.0
Expected

-0.1

-999.9
After 2008

 Don’t downgrade

 Downgrade

 PD

0.0001
Default

-10,000.0

-50.0
No Default

-10.0

-10.0
Expected

-11.0

-10.0

Now the example is contrived – I chose a set of parameters that demonstrates the point I’m trying to make. This isn’t a problem since I’m not saying this is what happened. I‘m saying it is plausible that S&P made a perfectly rationale (for them) decision to downgrade even if they didn’t think the US was more likely to default now than before.

In truth, the US might be more likely to default now than before, although the change is probability not sufficient on its own to merit a downgrade at this point. Especially since S&P have their maths wrong.


S&P’s arbitrary arithmetic

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It’s easy to get yourself into a corner if you make decisions without a sound basis. More than that, it’s really hard to change your mind if there was never a basis for the decision in the first base. Or if you don’t want to be honest about what the basis is.

What am I on about? The S&P’s downgrading of the US was political not economic. Whatever credibility they have left after the AAA rating of defaulting (and inherently likely to default) CDOs is now gone.

S&P showed their lack of understanding of US budgetary processes by mis-estimating the value of the spending cuts by $2 trillion. And when corrected, simply changed the rationale for the downgrading.

Yes, much of this comes from Paul Krugman.  I don’t pretend to understand the US budgeting process (yet) but at least I know that I don’t know.