Paul vs Paul on the US economy

Paul Krugman debates Ron Paul on live TV. Ill-advised or not, it is interesting to see their different takes go head to head. I’m not sure either really puts their points across very well, but I was a little surprised to see the vitriol in the comments of the YouTube video against Paul Krugman. Ron Paul clearly has a strong support base.

If you listen carefully, you won’t hear Ron Paul address any of the fundamental economic issues caused by the Gold Standard, you will hear him disagree with Milton Friedman and you will hear him use more emotive please than even Paul Krugman. Krugman, on the other hand, uses a mixture of emotive pleas with overly complex ideas and probably entirely misses his audience.

Simple fact is, a little inflation and currency depreciation would go a long way to fixing the structural problems with the US economy AS WELL as the defiicent-demand cyclical problems.

Watch the video.

For every complex problem…

For every complex problem, there is a solution that is clear, simple and wrong.

Greece is a complex problem. Paul Krugman points to this Choose Your Own Adventure on the Greek crisis. Much like the original books, there are many, many nasty ends.

Read it, try it, explore a few paths. This is the best resource I’ve seen recently to explain exactly how bad almost all the alternatives are, and how there are no really good outcomes from this mess.

Rest of The World, watch out.

What is best practice for matching annuities in Greece in 2012?

Best practice for matching non-profit annuities in most countries, certainly from a risk perspective, is still to cash flow match (or at the very least, match key durations) using government bonds.

The theory is that the insurer isn’t then exposed to changes in the term structure on interest rates, only exposed to illiqudity/reinvestment risk to the extent of mortality fluctuations, isn’t exposed to currency risk and certainly isn’t exposed to credit risk. Without complex margining requirements like some swaps and without the need to roll cash investments over, government bonds should allow ALM teams to sleep well.

Now, Solvency II is likely to adopt a swap yield curve rather than bond yield curve. There are some good reasons here, including arguably fewer distortions from temporary supply and demand imbalances, improved liquidity and so on. The same yield curve is used for liquid liabilities so the allowance for an illiquidity premium over and above the swap curve at some times, in some ways and for some products is still under debate.

But what should Greek insurers do in the meantime?

Frankly, Greek government bonds don’t remove credit risk and the huge credit spreads on these instruments will create huge funding gaps and variability in earnings unless a Greek govi yield curve is used to value liabilities as well. It’s not clear at all that Greece will stay part of the Euro, so German government bonds don’t remove currency risk. German government bonds in any case are show signs of nervousness as yields creep up.

The swap market is exposed to the same Euro break-up risks as bonds. Which banks will survive, what happens to currencies in the meantime and what does that do to long-term Euro swaps? What about Euro-Sterling swaps issued by Greek banks (I’m not sure if these even exist though).

All in all, it’s good to be involved in ALM in South Africa, and even the Middle East just at the moment.

Italy’s yields head towards 8%

Aside

Italy’s yields are heading towards 8%, which is about the same as South Africa. And South African inflation is flirting with 6% while Eurozone inflation is looking more like 1%.

Europe is in serious trouble and very few South Africans have yet woken up to exactly how serious this trouble is.

[update: intrade betting has it more likely than not that at least one country will leave the Euro by December 2014. If one goes, it's likely more than one will.]

Nearer the edge than ever before

Great piece outlining the very real, very possible and very very awful possibilities and implications of Italian default.

I wouldn’t want anything to do with any bank that has much at all to do with European banks or European sovereign debt. The old South African Rand is seeming like a safer relative bet than at pretty much any other time in the last decade.