Twenty Third Floor
Technical Business Advantage

According to a Fin24 story this morning, the FSB is probing smaller unit trusts.

The economics of a fund manager depends entirely on growing funds under management so that revenues (based on assets under management) grow to be larger than costs (significantly fixed and at most semi-variable). Details of performance fees and the second order impact of investment performance aside, a successful fund manager must attract positive net client cashflow, and lots of it.

Half the 960 available unit trusts have less than R100m in AUM. Some of these may be rapidly growing new funds, but many have been stagnant with slow growth for several years.

The FSB’s attention presents opportunities for consolidation between funds and should place larger funds in a stronger position competitively. Total Expense Ratios (TER) for these funds with significant scale should already be lower than smaller funds. Maybe it’s time the larger funds made more if their size and cost efficiencies. If they are going to take the heat for being too large to be nimble, they might as well reap the benefits too.

It will be interesting to see what this means for white labelled funds and whether the economics of these convince the regulator that they should survive.

Posted with WordPress for BlackBerry.

Ok, so that is an unfair title. But you’ll understand what I mean:

Zurich Financial Services has just been fined £2.3m for a data loss event incurred in 2008 in South Africa.

Zurich joins HSBC, Nationwide and Norwich Union in the club of companies fined by the FSA now.

In fairness, the fine wasn’t so much for losing the data, but rather for:

• losing
• unencrypted data
• and not having monitoring and controls in place
• so that it was only discovered and reported to regulators a year later

The South African perspective

The FSA’s seriousness about these issues is mirrored in our looming Protection of Personal Information Bill. This is not the same as the disturbing proposals for a Protection of Information Bill which covers public or government information. (more…)

The FT has an article (Banks win battle to tone down Basel III) describing how the proposed new rules for banking capital requirements might have some of the new requirements around liquidity removed or weakened.

Key amongst these new considerations is the limitation of mismatches between the term of assets and liabilities, which would limit the danger of a removal of deposits and wholesale funding in a crisis scenario. The problem is that this has been fundamental to the business model of banks for decades. Short-term assets (call, overnight, 30 day deposits) have been used to finance long-term liabilities (vehicle loans, home loans, business loans).

Retail deposits, even those technically call deposits, are generally quite sticky. This is in spite of the easily recallable image of queues of depositors wanting to get their money back. Typically, this is still a small fraction of total depositors (certainly in countries with retail deposit protection). Further, other banks have usually pulled or tried to pull their short-term funding (or simply not renewed overnight lending) well before the public even gets wind that there might be risks. As banks rely increasingly on wholesale finance, the risks of a liquidity and credit crisis are amplified as this money is teflon-coated and greased in terms of stickiness.

The banks argue there are other ways of managing the risk. It’s understandable that regulators around the world have had their confidence in banks’ risk management ability dented.

The real danger of overregulation of banks is not “too safe banks”, but rather an increase in the cost of providing banking and credit services to the economy (individual countries as well as the global economy) which could make limit economic growth and the replacement of jobs lost during the recession.

It’s going to be interesting to see how this develops.

May 6 2010.  Dow falls more than 1,000 points intraday, including a drop of P&G from around $60 to (according to some accounts) below $40. The Dow recovered most of the falls quickly, but these trades are now part of the historical time series.

Banks and others using risk management tools often back-test their models against historical data to see how whether the models capture past market movements in estimating potential future market movements. This blip may appear as an anomaly in these tests for some time.

(It’s more typical for the tests to use only closing prices rather than intra-day prices. However, this actually reflects a weakness in the typical models and is only a fortunate escape from today’s problems)

CEIOPS issued additional guidance around the standard formula for calculating capital requirements in respect of operational risk late last year.

Why was a new OpRisk formula needed?

The original formula for OpRisk proposed in QIS4 was widely condemned. Complaints included being too simplistic, being insensitive to risk (and basely primarily on business size) and the impossibility of calibrating to 99.5% in a meaningful way. CEIOPS accepts most of this criticism, but counters by reminding stakeholders that the aim of the standard formula is partly about being simple.

A more serious problem is that in comparison against companies’ own internal models, the standard formula produced results lower than companies’ own assessment. Median internal model requirements for OpRisk were 133% of the standard formula and 13 out of 16 countries reported higher requirements under their insurers’ internal models.

One of the aims of the standard formula is to be slightly conservative to provide an incentive for insurers to develop their internal models. Clearly this objective is not being achieved. (more…)

A friend “volunteered” me to answer an insurance question from Aardvark on allocating economic capital across different insurance products. After writing a short response, I received the frighteningly useful message: “Error”.

Having written a brief summary of the different techniques used in this really important area, I thought I should use it as a blog post. Maybe “Daan d.” from Cape Town will stumble across this answer eventually.

The question:

What is the standard practice to allow for diversification benefits when allocating capital required between different insurance products?

My brief answer (this is a huge topic!):

There is no standard practice. It’s one of the more irritating and subjective aspects of allocating capital between imperfectly correlated product

Economic Capital doesn’t have to be calculated as VaR, but I will use VaR below as a generalisation. Banks are typically slightly more mature in their capital allocation processes so what I’m describing below is often used in the banking world, but applies equally to insurance (life and non-life / P&C).

Splitting the capital in proportion to the sum of the components is frequently used, but is flawed and usually doesn’t give good results unless speed and simplicity are primary objectives. (more…)

Are you outraged at the proposed increase in electricity prices from Eskom?

Creative Commons License photo credit: Näystin

If you are, you’re not alone. 88% of readers polled in a News24 poll were “outraged” at the increase. The problem is that all this outrage is irrelevant at best, and dangerously distracting at worst.

Why price is the wrong thing to worry about

Eskom produces electricity for the country and makes a profit or a loss doing so. This profit or loss goes back into treasury, which, inefficiencies aside, belongs collectively to the citizens of South Africa.

If prices are too low and Eskom makes a loss, this shortfall must be made up through higher taxes or lower government spending. If Eskom is not given additional capital, it will have to stop buying coal and stop investing in new infrastructure.

Those who complain about the inflationary effects of electricity prices are considering the issue too narrowly. Electricity prices may be easier to see than broader macro-economic issues about budget deficits, growth-disincentives from higher taxes and other implications of funding electricity generation from general taxes, but that doesn’t mean it is the right way to look at the problem.

Expensive electricity is better than no electricity. Complaining about higher electricity prices, while understandable, is not useful since the money must come from somewhere.

The real 5 issues we should be discussing

1. Is Eskom generating electricity efficiently, and at an appropriate cost (compared  to international benchmarks, adjusted for our local fuel costs and other differences)? If Eskom is not producing power as cheaply as they should, let’s focus on fixing the operational and industrial design problems to fundamentally lower the costs of production. More efficiency benefits entire country. (more…)

The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed the 69th bank of 2009 recently. The rate of closures has increased recently, leading some analysts to believe that well over 100 banks could be closed this year.

The Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s in the US started at about the same pace, with 100 closures per year. However, the number of closures increased to a peak of 534 in 1989 – fully 9 years after the start of the uptick in closures in 1980.

The South African banking environment is different – very much fewer banks and arguably tighter regulation give the lack of deposit insurance. However, the pain that US banks are feeling informs views that our banking sector still has pain to live through before turning around.