In the footsteps of the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz

cover of In the Footsteps of Mr KurtzAny company, person or country looking to invest in Africa must read Michela Wrong’s book, “In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo” .

The book details the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from its pre-Stanley (yes, that Stanley) days before east African Muslim traders were replaced by European explorers through to the eventual downfall of Mobuto Sese Seko and the arrival of Laurent Kabila in the mid-90s.

The “Congo Free State” became the personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium, the only monarch to actually own a colony. Even against the backdrop of typical colonial abuses, it seems King Leopold was a particularly nasty character, taking his Belgian subjects along for the ride even as he pillaged the depths of Africa.

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Book Review: How The Mighty Fall

cover of How The Mighty Fall

How The Mighty Fall

Jim Collins set out to write an article on how successful companies fail. For some reason, probably commercial, he decided to turn it into a short book.

He should have stuck with the article idea.

While the ideas presented are certainly interesting, there is nowhere near enough material to justify R290. Almost half the book is “appendices” covering, very weakly, some of the victims of the financial crisis and providing background data and information that gave rise to the conclusions reached.

I usually quite like the idea of having all the information available so the conclusions don’t have to be taken on blind faith. I just don’t see why these couldn’t be provided for free on the web or something.

I was also very disappointed to not see a greater distinction drawn between failure of large, geared financial services firms that take on too much, poorly understood risk and other enterprises with very different reasons for failure. I’m starting to doubt how much Jim Collins even knows about financial services firms and what led to the recent troubles!

Read it for sure, but read it quickly and make sure you’re reading a borrowed copy from some mug like me who actually paid full-book-price for a long article.

The Taxi and the Tea Party

The Taxi

It’s fair to say the South African taxi industry isn’t besotted with the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system. It’s understandable too. No matter what assurances are provided around newly jobless taxi drivers being placed within BRT, the reality is that a more efficient service with larger vehicles will need fewer drivers.

It’s also blindingly obvious that a more efficient, safer and better controlled public transport system is overwhelmingly to the advantage of pretty much every other citizen in our wonderful country.

A small group (often termed a Special Interest Group) lobbies (politically or through protests or violence) for a change (or the maintenance of the status quo) to their advantage at the expense of the wider population. Taxi owners and drivers have their livelihood at stake. Of course they care disproportionately compared to the rest of us!

The Tea Party

The Boston Tea Party is commonly interpreted as an inspirational story of the colonists of the New World growing tired of economic exploitation and the famous “No taxation without representation”.

Of course this is not the true story. Continue reading

Deja vu and the myopia of our spirit

Amongst the stormy seas of markets recently (off the back of a credit and liquidity crunch apparently initiated by ongoing and deepening problems with sub-prime loans in the US and the related CDOs), bobs the grey and bloated bodies of a clichéd failure.

Unwavering belief in trends, normal market conditions and trading rules developed out of a less than infinite history of prices have again resulted in burnt fingers and an abundance of flotsam and jetsam on the high seas of international markets. Computer and algorithm-driven “quant funds” have apparently taken a beating in the “unusual” market conditions of late. These systems are usually calibrated to a period of history, to identify profitable trading strategies based on complicated models, multiple factors and supposedly rigorous statistical analysis.
High volatility and correlation across markets took down LTCM (read When Genius Failed 1) before. So-called “programme-trading” or “portfolio insurance” that was blamed (non incontroversially and not fully substantiated) for the 1987 market crash. Portfolio insurance is still alive and well in the form of delta hedging. Turns out the old name had a rather negative taint to it. Don’t get the wrong idea, I’m not against delta-hedging, or any specific trading strategy. I’m just not convinced that the results are all they’re cracked up to be. A system that works well some of the time then fails spectacularly every now and then is not my idea of a good night’s sleep, or a sustainable long-term strategy.

Goldman Sach’s apparently still believes in the system. Then again, they have to say that, don’t they?

The developers of these systems would do well to look at the past from a human and historical view rather than just a limited slice of a time-series. It’s too easy to consider recent history as representative of the future. We all do it, but the trick is to maintain some scepticism and not get carried away by hope, greed and fear.

Fooled by the Black Swan

Is your organisation one black swan away from disaster? Are you taking hidden risks in the quest for success, and using hope as your only risk management tool?

Nassim Taleb’s books should be required reading for life

Nassim Taleb is one of my new favourite authors. I’m actually a little slow on the uptake here since I am currently reading his 2005 book “Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets.â€? meanwhile the New York Times has his current book “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbableâ€? on their best-seller list. I wholeheartedly recommend “Fooled by Randomnessâ€?, and fully expect that once I have read his current book I will be able to do the same for that.

Dumb luck is a large contributor to success in an uncertain world

Do you want the success of your organisation to be at the mercy of dumb luck?

Nassim Taleb’s writings resonate with me, because I agree with them. He just has an infinitely more entertaining (let alone more convincing) way of explaining his viewpoints. One of his major themes is how poor our understanding is of randomness. And he’s not talking about the “average joeâ€? in the street. If anything, he is more scathing of those so-called experts of the financial markets who are made or broken largely by luck. The unlucky fall be the wayside not be heard from, whereas the lucky shout their own praises from the rooftops.

I am not going to go further into his arguments in this post – the book is worthwhile reading if you are interested. However, I do want to touch a theme introduced in Fooled, and further expounded upon (I assume) in “The Black Swan�.

At some stage, the sun is going to stop rising

In the not so distant past, it was assumed that all swans must be white. Every swan ever seen had been white. All the classical statistical inference would have attributed a 100% probability to all swans being white. Until the rather unfortunate discovery of a little place called Australia. Enter the Black Swan.

Don’t trust past experience blindly, and trust your intuition even less

In risk management terms (and when I talk about risk management I include managing an organisation in the face of uncertainty, which includes every organisation I have ever known), events that may seem extremely unlikely based on past information and experience may still happen. If the occurrence of a black swan for your organisation would be catastrophic, are you really prepared to just hope that the past experience to date accurately reflects the future?

Actuaries and risk management

“Actuaries only look at the past so they are Fooled by Randomness.” This is a superficial description of actuarial work. Without a doubt, actuaries look to the past to infer certain parameters about the future. I’m not convinced this is necessarily bad as long as one realises that the past is not all there is to the future. The impact of HIV/AIDS and annuitant mortality improvements are typical of areas where actuaries have recognised that the past does not reflect the future and attempt to adjust for this in their calculations. Actuaries have the unfortunate job of trying to accurately estimate what this unknown future scenario will look like, rather than recognising that the risks exists and managing it.

When it comes to managing potentially catastrophic risks, Mr Taleb’s preferred practice is to limit all risks no matter how unlikely they may seem. The good news here is that if the consensus view is that the risks are extremely unlikely, the costs of mitigating those risks (transferring, hedging, reinsuring, selling etc.) should be relatively low. Mr Taleb prefers to find ways to use past patterns to make a profit, but use a sophisticated paranoia when managing the risks. He goes further and aims to benefit from the occasional black swan that flies his way. Again, more of this in his very worthwhile reading books.

Understanding all these potential risks, and understanding the potential for financial or operational impact on your organisation is not easy. Some of the results can be counter-intuitive, and simply drilling through the analytical steps to get to practical, useful steps requires a combination of common sense, uncommon insight into risk, and a tool-set capable of meeting the problems head-on.

In general, the human mind is a pretty poor tool for understanding a probabilistic world and making good decisions in the face of uncertainty.

What makes a good decision?

As an aside, another element of Mr Taleb’s thinking that I read with a fervently nodding head is that in an uncertain world, decisions should not be evaluated based on the outcome, but rather on whether it was the right decision given the information available at the time the decision was made. This is also not to say that the outcome never provides any information about the quality of the decision, just that it usually doesn’t. For example, take the decision to call “headsâ€? on the toss of a “fairâ€? coin. If the coin dutifully lands heads up, does that make the decision a good decision? I would argue very strongly that it does not. A more difficult example to agree with is that of a fund manager selecting a particular stock. If it the share appreciates in value over some period, is that sufficient evidence to show that the “buyâ€? call was a good one? Again, I would argue that it doesn’t. Especially when there is a large selection of fund managers making calls on all manner of stocks on a regular basis. Some of them have to be right some of the time. And a few of them will be right a great deal of the time just through luck.

Do you have a Black Swan?

Now if your organisation has a currency exposure, perhaps you are importing a component of your production process, or maybe your sales are partly to a foreign country, should you be bullish on the exchange rate? Should you be tring to time the market? Or should you be managing your risk by removing the areas of uncertainty over which you have no control, and where you are likely to be less informed than most professional currency traders, and where those self-same professional currency traders are playing in a massively uncertain world, where those with good “track recordsâ€? are more likely to be lucky than skillful? What happens if the Black Swan of a sharp exchange rate depreciation (or appreciation) is enough to wipe our your year’s operational earnings?

“We can’t afford risk management”

A common response to the argument for risk management is that hedging (or reinsurance, or put options or credit guarantees or business interruption insurance) is expensive. As I alluded to before, if the risk really is that unlikely, the cost should be relatively low. If the cost is high, it may reflect that others have a more prudent view of the possibilities of those risks than you do, which should start the alarm bells ringing immediately. The other side is that do you really believe than an appropriate way to build and manage your organisation is to continually take a small but very real risk of a catastrophic risk in order to make additional profit? If that is the primary source of profit for your organisation, then the fundamentals of that business may need to be revisited. Selling far out of the money naked call options as an income source may never get you into trouble and yield a modest revenue stream. Very few would agree that this is a good long-term strategy for success. A good number of the few that do have already been burnt in the process.

So what now for understanding and managing risk?

So there are four major points I would like to conclude with:

  1. If you operate an organisation, you operate in an uncertain world and are exposed to risks

  2. Just because you have never seen a Black Swan, doesn’t mean you will never see one.

  3. If there is a risk that could severely damage your business (a Black Swan), you had better have a better risk management strategy than closing your eyes and hoping

  4. Identifying these risks, measuring them and understanding their impact on your business, and then understanding the options available to you in managing those risks is an important and non-trivial exercise.

Practical optimisation

Optimisation is brilliant. It can turn increase profitability, reduce risk, increase output and even turn an non-viable project or factory into a viable one. It can save time, produce less waste and better utilise inputs so that costs are reduced.But it’s difficult, right? That’s why so few people pay real attention to it, why so many organisations don’t invest in the process, right? Well, the basic concepts are straightforward, and there are often valuable easy wins to arise from simply looking at the problem in the right way and understanding what the key drivers of production or profitability are.

The Goal

Eliyahu M. Goldratt wrote a called “The Goal” in the 1980s describing a practical, real-world approach to optimising a production plant. Written in the Socratic method, it guides the reader through the understanding of one approach of optimisation and explains how and why it works rather than insisting on taking the author’s word for it. The approach isn’t perfect, but it is a brilliant introduction into how to look at problems, and where typical management accounting falls down as a tool to manage production.

Demonstrating a principle – Making a cup of Milo

Milo is a warm, chocolate and malt drink produced by Nestle in some markets, including South Africa, Australia and some South-east Asian countries. If you don’t have Milo in your market, you can still follow the story considered here by thinking Ovaltine or even just your favourite brand of hot chocolate.

Milo on kitchen counterCan of Milo
The steps involved in making a cup of Milo are as follows:

  1. Retrieve can of Milo powder from cupboard
  2. Retrieve sugar bowl from its normal location
  3. Find your favourite mug and place it on the counter
  4. Find a teaspoon (try the drying rack next to the kitchen sink)
  5. Fetch the milk from the refrigerator
  6. Pour the milk into the mug
  7. Return the milk to the fridge
  8. Place the mug into the microwave and set on full power for approximately 2 minutes
  9. Wait for two minutes
  10. Retrieve mug of hot milk from the microwave
  11. Add several spoons (usually 3 or 4) of Milo powder into the mug and stir
  12. Add sugar to taste and stir some more
  13. Return Milo and sugar to respective cupboards
  14. Return mug to microwave for a further 10 seconds to give the drink that extra rich and foamy texture
  15. Enjoy!

This will take approximately 205 seconds as shown by the table below:
Optimisation example - Milo step before optimisation

The problem area here is step 9. We wait for a full two minutes while the rest of the plant (our brain, hands, feet and eyes) is shutdown with nothing to do.

A simple re-ordering of the steps can save 30 seconds out of this process.

Optimisation example - Milo re-ordered steps after optimisation

The key here is that step 9 now only has a plant downtime of 100 seconds (compared with 120 before) and step 14 now has no downtime at all (the 5 seconds is required to insert the mug into the microwave).

Principles revisited

The example above is trivial, and I’m not pretending that it is anything else. However, the principle behind the process is important. This is one of the key ideas put forward in the book “The Goal”. In order to optimise an entire, complex process or plant, one needs to identify the bottlenecks and optimise those first. There is little point in shaving a few microseconds off the time taken to put the milk back in the fridge when more than half of the total time spent in production is waiting for the “bottleneck” microwave to finish it’s job. If one could make the microwave work faster, that would also be a key component of the optimisation process.

The principle is, identify the bottleneck and optimise that and the processes surrounding that.

Popular Economics

The book, “Freakonomics”, has become something of a pop icon amongst certain groups. The Stevens (well, Steven and Stephen, Levitt and Dubner respectively) cleverly show how economic analysis can shed light on some interesting everyday (and not so everyday) problems and observations. I thoroughly enjoyed it while not agreeing with each and every word. Entertaining, yes. Insightful, definitely. A work of pure genius, probably not. Overall a worthwhile read for those interesting in either of economics or life (and I’m not tying myself down to admitting that these may be mutually exclusive) would benefit from reading it. If it does tend to get a little slow after a while, persevere through to the end. Even if only to make sure you can laugh and nod in the appropriate places during the next cocktail party with that same certain group.

On the other hand, if you are looking for a reminder of what economics is all about on a slightly more technical note, Tim Harford’s book, “The Undercover Economist” is definitely worth a read. I gather it’s partly derived from articles written for the Financial Times magazine where Mr Harford has a column. I enjoyed Freakonomics enough (and have enough respect for Steven Levitt) that when I read on the front cover “‘Required Reading’ Steven D. Levitt” I picked it off the shelf from Exclusive Books with hardly a glance inside.

The Undercover Economist takes the reader from the basics of economics (allocation of scarce resources) through perfect competition and into the bowls of market failures. Some of the examples that particularly resonated with me were second-hand automobiles and health insurance, one of which is an area I know a fair bit about and it’s not cars.

Freakonomics
Steven D. Levitt, Stephen J. Dubner
Paperback (B format) – 256 pages (06 April 2006) Penguin Books Ltd
EAN: 9780141019017
Country of publication: UK

The Undercover Economist
Tim Harford
Paperback – 288 pages (06 April 2006) Little, Brown Book Group
EAN: 9780316731164
Country of publication: UK